Suzan Palmer v. Justin Anderson, Keith Schrenk and James Davis : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
1990
Suzan Palmer v. Justin Anderson, Keith Schrenk
and James Davis : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Robert L. Jeffs; Jeffs & Jeffs; Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents.
Glen A. Cook; Robert J. Debry & Associates; Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Palmer v. Davis, No. 900109 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1990).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/2485
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BRIEF . 
UTAH 
DOCUMENT 
K F U 
50 
.£.10 
DOCKET NO. 
•0O|OfK 
•TTAW rr.TjRT OF APPEALS 
SUZAN PALMER, individually \ 
and on behalf of her son ] 
JEREMY FREIER, a minor, ] 
P1 a ii iti f £ s i Appe 1 ] ai its , 
vs . 
JUSTIN ANDERSON, KEITH ; 
SCHRENK, and JAMES DAVIS ' 
Defendants/Respondents. 
I Case No: 900109-CA 
i Category 14(b) 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE J. PHILIP EVES, PRESIDING 
GLEN A. COOK 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
ROBERT L. JEFFS 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 846 0'H 
JUL 2 6 1990 
COURT 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SUZAN PALMER, individually 
and on behalf of her son ] 
JEREMY FREIER, a minorf ) 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, ; 
vs. ] 
JUSTIN ANDERSON, KEITH ' 
SCHRENK, and JAMES DAVIS 
Defendants/Respondents. 
| Case No: 900109-CA 
i Category 14(b) 
APPELLANTS' REPLY BRIEF 
APPEAL FROM THE JUDGMENT OF THE 
FIFTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF IRON COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE HONORABLE J. PHILIP EVES, PRESIDING 
GLEN A. COOK 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84107 
ROBERT L. JEFFS 
JEFFS & JEFFS 
Attorneys for Defendants/Respondents 
90 North 100 East 
P.O. Box 888 
Provo, UT 84603 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ASSUMING THAT FREIER AND DAVIS ARE CO-EMPLOYEES 
OF SCHRENK, KANARRA AND/OR MANZA, FREIER'S CLAIM 
IS NOT BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-60, BUT 
IS ALLOWED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-57 . . . 
POINT II 
JEREMY FREIER WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF SCHRENK, 
KANARRA, AND/OR MANZA UNDER THE ACT. AT THE 
LEAST, QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST REGARDING 
JEREMY'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
POINT IIA 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER 
SCHRENK WAS AN EMPLOYER UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 
35-1-42(3)(a)(ii) 
POINT IIB 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FREIER AND SCHRENK 
SATISFIES THE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT STANDARD . . . . 
POINT IIIA 
ALTHOUGH QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST REGARDING 
DAVIS'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS, FREIER MAY PURSUE HIS 
CLAIM REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT DAVIS WAS 
SCHRENK'S EMPLOYEE 
POINT IIIB 
DAVIS WAS NOT A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY OF THE 
RELEASE 
ii 
POINT IIIC 
DAVIS PAID NO CONSIDERATION FOR THE RELEASE AND 
CANNOT ENFORCE IT 17 
POINT HID 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE RELEASE ALLOWS FREIER'S 
CLAIM AGAINST DAVIS 18 
CONCLUSION 19 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 20 
iii 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
Cases Page 
Basin Land Irrigation Co. v. Hal Butte Canal Co., 
114 Idaho 121, 754 P.2d 434 (1988) 5 
Board of Education of Alpine School District v. Olsen, 
684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984) 6f 11 
Hansen v. Green River Group, 
748 P.2d 1102 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) 15 
Harry L, Young & Sons, Inc. v. Ashton, 
538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975) 11 
Heck v. Dow, Inc., 
93 Idaho 377, 461 P.2d 717 (1969) 7 
Holmstead v. Abbott GM Diesel, 
27 Utah 2d 109, 493 P.2d 625 (1972) 4, 13 
Lail v. Bishop, 
70 Idaho 284, 215 P.2d 955 (1949) 12 
Maryland Casualty Company v. Industrial Commission, 
12 Utah 2d 223, 364 P.2d 1020 (1961) 9 
Molino v. Asher, 
588 P.2d 1033 (Nev. 1979) 4 
Moloso v. State, 
644 P.2d 205 (Alaska 1982) 8 
Mountaineer v. Utah Power & Light Co., 
773 P.2d 405 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 1 
Oregon Bank v. Nautilus Crane & Eguipment Corp., 
68 Or. App. 131, 683 P.2d 95 (1984) 16 
Peterson v. Sorenson, 
91 Utah 507, 65 P.2d 12 (1937) 2-4 
Quagliana v. Exguisite Home Builders, Inc., 
538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975) 15 
Resource Management Co. v. Weston Ranch and 
Livestock Co. , Inc. , 706 P.2d 1028 (Utah 1985) 17 
iv 
Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 
773 P.2d 1382 (Utah 1989) 18 
Smith v. Brown, 
27 Utah 2d 155, 493 P.2d 994 (1972) 9 
State ex rel. Ferguson v. District Court, 
519 P.2d 151 (Mont. 1974) . . 8 
Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 
652 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1982) 15, 16 
Other Authorities 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 24(c) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (3) (a) 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42 (3) (a) (ii) 6 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 7 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43(1) (b) 12 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-57 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 1 
v 
The appellants submit this Reply Brief pursuant to 
Rule 24(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENT'S POINT I) 
ASSUMING THAT FREIER AND DAVIS ARE CO-EMPLOYEES 
OF SCHRENK, KANARRA AND/OR MANZA, FREIER'S CLAIM IS 
NOT BARRED BY UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-60, BUT IS 
ALLOWED UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-57 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-57 ("Section 57") provides that 
if an injured employee's employer does not comply with the 
Workers' Compensation Act ("Act") by providing workers' 
compensation insurance, that employee may pursue a common law 
negligence action against the employer and/or the injured 
employee's co-employee. This is an exception to the exclusive 
remedy of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60 ("Section 60"). 
Davis argues, without citing any case authority, that 
the exception of Section 57 applies only to employers and not 
to negligent co-employees. Davis's cite to Mountaineer v. Utah 
Power & Light Co., 773 P.2d 405 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) has 
nothing to do with this case. Mountaineer simply says that if 
workers' compensation benefits are available to the injured 
employee, that is his exclusive remedy against the employer or 
fellow employee. The appellants don't disagree with that, but 
that's not this case. No workers' compensation benefits were 
available to Jeremy Freier. Freier is free to pursue his 
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negligence claim against his employer or co-employee. This 
position is supported by Peterson v. Sorenson, 91 Utah 507, 65 
P.2d 12 (1937). In Peterson, the Utah Supreme Court stated: 
It is contended that if an employer does 
not carry compensation insurance, he and 
his employees are denied the advantages 
provided by the statute and relieved from 
the liabilities of the act, and that they 
remain under their common-law rights and 
liabilities. . . . The real question, 
therefore, is: Is the defendant within or 
without the exclusive remedy provisions of 
the Workers' Compensation Act? (Emphasis 
added.) 
Id. at 15. 
The Peterson court went on to hold that a non-
complying employer is not within the provisions of the Act and 
then stated: 
[T]he employee is not required to rely on 
the Industrial Act at all as a basis for 
recovery against the non-complying 
employer. . . . The mere fact that the 
Industrial Act contains the provisions 
which make it less burdensome for plaintiff 
to establish his claim and take from 
defendant certain defenses does not 
justify the conclusion that the cause of 
action is one created by statute. 
Moreover, the non-complying employer "shall 
not be entitled to the benefit of this 
title during the period of noncompliance." 
Section 42-1-54 (former Section 57). 
Id. at 17. (Emphasis and parenthetic statement added.) 
This quotation from the Peterson case directly 
contradicts Davis's statement that "the presence of a non-
complying employer in a case does not thrust the injured 
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employee out of the workings of the workers' compensation 
scheme and into the morass of common law actions." 
(Respondent's Brief at p. 9.) That's exactly what the presence 
of a non-complying employer does. The appellants do not, 
however, think that common law actions are such a "morass." 
The question is simply whether or not Davis was negligent. 
Davis argues that a negligent co-employee of an 
employer not complying with the Act should not be subject to a 
negligence claim of an injured co-employee. Davis argues that 
the negligent co-employee "cannot police his employer's 
compliance with the Act and therefore is not penalized for the 
employer's non-compliance." (Respondent's Brief at p. 8.) 
Davis cites no authority for that position. The appellants 
submit that no such authority can be found. Such a position 
assumes that, absent the Act, negligent co-employees are 
entitled to some kind of inherent immunity from negligence 
claims. That's not true. Negligent co-employees are entitled 
to the Act's statutory immunity through no act of their own, 
but because their employers have complied with the Act. When, 
as here, the employer does not comply with the Act, the 
negligent co-employee is, and should be, subject to common-law 
negligence liability. Peterson v. Sorenson, 91 Utah 507, 65 
P.2d 12 (1927). 
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Davis misinterprets the appellants' reliance on 
Molino v. As her
 f 588 P.2d 1033 (Nev. 1979). In Molino, the 
Nevada Supreme Court held that, under the Act, the Legislature 
only intended to exempt the negligent co-employee if the 
employer would be responsible for the negligence of the 
employee under the doctrine of respondent superior and the if 
employer provided benefits under the Act. Ici. at 1035. In 
other words, in a situation where the Act does not apply 
because of the employer's non-compliance, the Legislature did 
not intend to exempt the negligent co-employee from liability. 
This conclusion is consistent with the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Holmstead v. Abbott GM Diesel, 27 Utah 2d 
109, 493 P.2d 625 (1972). Holmstead states that a negligent 
employee is individually responsible for his conduct whether or 
not he is in the scope of his employment. Whether the 
employee is in the scope of his employment is relevant only to 
the employer's vicarious liability for that employee's 
negligence. Freier seeks no vicarious liability recovery from 
Davis's alleged employers. Davis is, and should be 
responsible for his own negligence. 
Section 57 allows Freier to pursue this negligence 
claim against Davis. Summary judgment on the exclusive remedy 
of Section 60 was error. 
4 
POINT II 
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT II) 
JEREMY FREIER WAS NOT AN EMPLOYEE OF SCHRENK, KANARRA, 
AND/OR MANZA UNDER THE ACT. AT THE LEAST, QUESTIONS 
OF FACT EXIST REGARDING JEREMY'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS 
Davis claims that Freier "has the burden to prove he 
is within one of the exceptions [i.e., not an employee] and is 
not precluded from recovery outside of the Act." (Respondent's 
Brief p. 17.) That's wrong. The burden of proof is on the 
party attempting to use the Act as a shield to avoid tort 
liability. If that party fails to meet that burden, the 
exclusive remedy provision of the Act does not apply and the 
civil action may go forward. Basin Land Irrigation Co. v. Hal 
Butte Canal Co., 114 Idaho 121, 754 P.2d 434 (1988). Davis has 
not met his burden. 
Even if Freier had the burden to prove that he was 
not an employee, all of the deposition testimony cited in his 
Brief carries that burden or, at least, creates fact issues for 
a jury to determine. Davis's statement that "Jeremy Freier 
failed to provide any evidence that he fell within any of the 
exceptions to Act" is specious in light of the deposition 
testimony set forth in Freier's Brief. 
Davis argues that Freier is an employee under the 
definition of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-43 ("Section 43"). In 
cases factually similar to this one, however, the Utah Supreme 
5 
Court has held that workers like Jeremy Freier are not 
employees under the Act. One such case is Board of Education 
of Alpine School District v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 49 (Utah 1984). 
In that case, a carpenter acting as a volunteer in woodshop 
classes was deemed not to be an employee under Section 43. The 
factors included in the Court's decision also apply to Freier's 
relationship with Kanarra and Manza: 
In the present case, Olsen received no 
compensation for helping in shop classes. 
. The school district had no control 
over his hours or any aspect of his 
volunteer work. There is no evidence that 
he or the school district intended to 
establish an employment relationship, even 
an informal one. . . . In conclusion, there 
is no evidence that an implied contract of 
hire existed between the parties. 
Therefore, there is no basis for the 
conclusion that Olsen was an employee for 
purposes of workers' compensation. 
Id. at 52. 
For those same reasons, Freier was not an employee 
under Section 4 3 and he may pursue his negligence claim 
against Davis. 
Davis argues that Keith Schrenk was an employer under 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42(3)(a)(ii) because he employed more 
than five workers. Davis claims at least eight employees, 
including Schrenk, Justin Anderson and Jeremy Freier. Schrenk 
and Anderson are excluded under the statute because they are 
6 
immediate family. That leaves six "employees" including 
Freier. That is the minimum allowed for Schrenk to qualify as 
an employer. Davis testified that Schrenk would just hire 
"really anyone from town" to do jobs as necessary. (R. 273, p. 
6). That raises the additional factual question of whether any 
of these "employees" were casual employees under Utah Code Ann. 
§35-1-43. If so, they cannot qualify as employees under the 
Act and Schrenk cannot qualify as an employer under Utah Code 
Ann. § 35-1-42(3)(a). Whether someone is a "casual employee" 
under the Act is a question of fact. Heck v. Dow, Inc. , 9 3 
Idaho 377, 461 P.2d 717 (1969). 
The number of "employees," however, does not end the 
inquiry. The statute has hourly and weekly work requirements. 
Davis does not address these issues because there is no 
evidence in the record about the time these people worked. 
Without that evidence, Davis cannot carry his burden of proving 
that Schrenk is an employer under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-
42(3)(a). 
Davis next addresses the control issue and makes an 
interesting flip-flop from his position in the trial court. In 
the trial court, Davis tried to use the control issue to show 
that Freier was an employee, stating that "since there was so 
much control exercised over Jeremy Freier, he was, as a matter 
of law, an employee of Keith Schrenk, Kanarra Partnership and 
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Manza Investment, Inc." (R. 158). On appeal, Davis realizes 
that the question of control is a fact issue making summary 
judgment improper. Davis, therefore, discounts the control 
issue, stating that "the issue of control is only relevant in 
distinguishing between a worker's status as an employee or as 
an independent contractor." (Respondent's Brief p. 14). Davis 
can't have it both ways. 
The test for determining whether an employer-employee 
relationship exists is whether one has the right to control the 
details of another individual's work. State ex rel. Ferguson 
v. District Court, 519 P.2d 151 (Mont. 1974). The question of 
control is a question of fact. Moloso v. State, 644 P. 2d 205 
(Alaska 1982). The deposition testimony regarding control 
cited by Freier in his initial Brief creates factual issues 
that must be determined by a jury. 
Finally, on the control issue, Davis claims that 
there was "no evidence that Jeremy Freier had any independence 
in his performance of the work on the farm." (Respondent's 
Brief p. 15). The evidence shows that Freier had complete 
independence. As explained by Shirlee Reeves, Jeremy didn't 
even have to be there. He could have left any time he wanted. 
(R. 269, p. 32.) Schrenk had no authority or control over 
Freier. 
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Davis claims that because of the remedial purpose of 
the Act, courts are more willing to find employee status. 
That is true, but not for the reason Davis claims. Courts 
broadly construe the term "employee" in favor of coverage in 
order to provide compensation benefits to injured workers. 
Maryland Casualty Company v. Industrial Commission, 12 Utah 2d 
223, 364 P.2d 1020 (1961). The Act's "remedial purpose" 
referred to by Davis is to "create a system whereby the injured 
employee would be assured of medical and hospital care and a 
certain though modest compensation for injuries. Smith v. 
Brown, 27 Utah 2d 155 157, 493 P.2d 994 (1972). 
The term "employee" is broadly construed to provide 
benefits; not to provide broader immunity to negligent co-
employees. As discussed in Freier's initial Brief, the Act was 
enacted to protect employers providing statutory benefits, not 
to protect negligent co-employees. When no benefits are 
available, as here, the Act should be construed to allow the 
fullest recovery for the injured worker. Davis's 
interpretation of the Act limits the injured worker's ability 
to such recovery by expanding the definition of those entitled 
to tort immunity, even when the employer has provided no 
benefits. 
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POINT IIA 
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENTS POINT IIA) 
MATERIAL ISSUES OF FACT EXIST AS TO WHETHER SCHRENK 
WAS AN EMPLOYER UNDER UTAH CODE ANN. § 35-1-42(3)(a)(ii) 
Many of Davis's arguments in Point IIA are addressed 
by Freier in Point II of this Reply Brief• Davis asserts, 
without citing authority, that once prima facie evidence is 
presented that the injured employee is an "employee" under the 
Act, the burden of proof shifts to the injured employee to show 
that he is not such an "employee*" 
Freier does not agree that this is the law. Even if 
it were, Freier disputes that Davis has presented prima facie 
evidence that Freier was an "employee" under the Act. Davis 
does not explain what that prima facie evidence is. Davis 
argues that Freier cannot rest on bare allegations. Neither 
can Davis. 
Davis alleges that Freier "did not present any 
evidence in the form of affidavits, or in any other form as 
otherwise provided by Rule 56, that showed Jeremy Freier could 
fall within one of the exceptions provided by the Act." That 
is simply false. Deposition testimony, as outlined in Freier's 
initial Brief, was cited to raise questions of fact regarding 
Schrenk as an agricultural employer, the number of "employees" 
at the farm, the control exercised over Freier, and Freier as a 
casual employee. The material facts are disputed and 
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susceptible to more than one logical inference. Summary 
Judgment was improper. 
POINT IIB 
(REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S POINT IIB) 
THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN FREIER AND SCHRENK 
SATISFIES THE CASUAL EMPLOYMENT STANDARD 
Davis claims, without citation to the record, that 
hauling rocks out of the field was "necessary to, or in the 
furtherance of [Schrenk's] usual trade, business or 
occupation." Other than statements by Davis's counsel, which 
are not evidence, there is nothing in the record even 
addressing what Schrenk's usual trade business or occupation 
is, a necessary element of determining casual employment. 
Summary judgment was improper. 
Davis claims, again without citation to authority, 
that the determination of employee status does not turn on 
whether the alleged employee receives money or wages for his 
services. The Utah Supreme Court has stated, however, that: 
This Court has articulated several factors 
to be considered in establishing whether an 
employment relationship exists. . . . An 
employee is hired and paid a salary or 
wage, works under the direction of the 
employer, and is subject to the employer's 
control. 
Board of Education of Alpine School District v. Olsen, 684 P.2d 
49, 52 (Utah 1984) (citing Harry L. Young & Sons, Inc. v. 
Ashton, 538 P.2d 316 (Utah 1975). 
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None of those elements is present in this case. 
Freier did not work on a regular basis. (R. 269, p. 16.) 
Freier was not paid any wage or salary for his work. (R. 269, 
p. 32.) There were no foremen or supervisors over the workers. 
(R. 273, p. 6.) This "employment" was casual. It was 
uncertain, occasional, at irregular intervals and for a limited 
and temporary purpose: to move some rocks. Lail v. Bishop, 7 0 
Idaho 284, 215 P.2d 955 (1949). As such, Freier was a casual 
employee under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-4 3 (l)(b) and not an 
"employee" under the Act. 
POINT IIIA 
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENT'S POINT IIIA) 
ALTHOUGH QUESTIONS OF FACT EXIST REGARDING 
DAVIS'S EMPLOYMENT STATUS, FREIER MAY PURSUE 
HIS CLAIM REGARDLESS OF WHETHER OR NOT DAVIS 
WAS SCHRENK'S EMPLOYEE 
Freier is not raising questions of Davis's employment 
status with Kanarra and Manza for the first time on appeal. 
This argument was raised in the trial court in Freier's legal 
memorandum in opposition to Davis's motion for summary 
judgment. The relevant portion of that memorandum was included 
in the Addendum of Freier's initial Brief and states: 
For all of the reasons stated in Points I 
and II of this memorandum, just as Jeremy 
Freier was not an employee of the released 
defendants, neither was James Davis. (R. 
195. ) 
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Davis makes two statements in Point IIIA which are 
false and misperceive Freier's claims. First, Davis states 
that "the entire foundation of Jeremy Freier's claims against 
James Davis is based on the allegation that James Davis was an 
employee." Second, Davis claims that "Jeremy Freier could only 
find a duty owed by James Davis to Freier if there was a co-
employee relationship, because bystanders do not owe a duty to 
prevent the negligent driving of a third party." 
Addressing the first statement, Davis's liability is 
not based on his employment status, but rather, on his conduct. 
While the employment status of a negligent employee may be 
relevant in determining an employer's liability under the 
doctrine of respondent superior, Freier makes no such claim 
against Davis's alleged employer. As stated by the Utah 
Supreme Court: 
The liability of the servant arises wholly 
because of his personal act in doing the 
wrong; it does not arise out of the 
relation of master and servant but exists 
upon the common law obligation that every 
person must so act or use that which he 
controls as not to injure another. 
Holmstead v. Abbott GM Diesel, 27 Utah 2d 109, 112-13, 493 P.2d 
615 (1972) . 
If Davis had a duty to supervise Justin Anderson, 
regardless of Davis's employment status, he may be liable for 
breach of that duty. That brings us to Davis's second 
incorrect statement. 
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Davis claims that "Jeremy Freier could only find a 
duty owed by James Davis to Freier if there was a co-employee 
relationship, because bystanders do not owe a duty to prevent 
the negligent driving of a third party." That statement is 
false and contrary to accepted principles of negligence law. 
If Davis had a duty (whether as a supervising 
employee, babysitter, or friend doing a favor for Schrenk) to 
supervise Anderson and didn't, and that failure to supervise 
was a proximate cause of injury to Freier, Freier has stated a 
prima facie negligence claim against Davis. Davis's duty is 
not, as Davis claims, conditioned on Davis and Freier being co-
employees. The relevant relationship is between Davis and 
Anderson. Davis and Anderson need not be co-employees, as long 
as the facts support Davis's duty to supervise Anderson in the 
operation of the truck. For example, a father or mother, or 
babysitter may be liable for letting a child under their 
supervision drive a car. There is no employment relationship 
there. Contrary to Davis's uncited claim, a bystander may very 
well have a duty to prevent negligent driving of a third party, 
if the facts regarding the relationship between the bystander 
and the third party create a duty of supervision in the 
bystander. That is Freier's theory of the case here. 
Davis claims the definition of "employee" in the Act 
has nothing to do with the Release because the Release is 
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governed by contract law, not the Act. The Release, however, 
does not define "employee." The Utah Supreme Court has stated 
that insofar as ordinances or statutes are applicable to a 
contract, the ordinance or statute is, by operation of law, an 
implied term of contract. Quagliana v. Exquisite Home 
Builders, Inc., 538 P.2d 301 (Utah 1975). The term "employee", 
as defined in the Act, is relevant and applicable to the 
Release and may be considered in interpreting the Release. 
POINT IIIB 
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENT'S POINT IIIB) 
DAVIS WAS NOT A THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY 
OF THE RELEASE 
Davis argues that he is a third party beneficiary of 
the Release, impliedly acknowledging that he is not a party to 
the Release and has no privity of contract. The rights of 
third party beneficiaries are determined by the intentions of 
the parties to the contract, based on the contract and 
"contracting situation." Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. 
Dickamore, 652 P.2d 1314, 1315 (Utah 1982). This Court 
recently stated: 
For a third-party beneficiary to have a 
right to enforce a right, the intention of 
the parties to confer a separate and 
distinct benefit upon the third party must 
be clear. 
Hansen v. Green River Group, 748 P.2d 1102, 1105 (Utah Ct. App. 
1988) . 
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For all of the reasons set forth in Point HID of 
Freier's initial Brief, the parties to the Release had no 
intent to confer a benefit upon Davis. In fact, the only time 
Davis is expressly mentioned in the Release is when Freier is 
reserving his right to pursue his negligence claim against 
Davis. That is directly contrary to any claimed intent to 
benefit Davis. As such, Davis cannot be a donee beneficiary. 
Davis does not allege, and there does not exist, any 
actual or supposed duty from Freier to Davis which would 
qualify Davis as a creditor beneficiary. Davis is, therefore 
"a stranger to the promise and may assert no rights 
thereunder." Tracy Collins Bank & Trust v. Dickamore, 652 P.2d 
1314, 1315 (Utah 1982). 
Assuming without admitting that, as Davis claims, it 
was undisputed that Davis was as an employee of Kanarra and 
Manza, why would Freier expressly reserve his rights to. pursue 
this claim against Davis, but release Davis if he was an 
employee of Kanarra and Manza? The reservation would be 
meaningless. A construction of an agreement which renders any 
part of it meaningless should be avoided. Oregon Bank v. 
Nautilus Crane & Equipment Corp., 68 Or. App. 131, 683 P.2d 95 
(1984). 
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POINT IIIC 
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENTS POINT IIIC) 
DAVIS PAID NO CONSIDERATION FOR THE RELEASE 
AND CANNOT ENFORCE IT 
Freier does not argue that no consideration was paid 
for the Release. Freier acknowledges that the parties who were 
released paid consideration of $225,000 for that Release. 
Freier argues that Davis paid no consideration for the Release 
and cannot enforce it. 
Consideration is an act or a promise bargained for 
and given in exchange for a promise. Resource Management Co. 
v. Weston Ranch and Livestock Co., Inc., 706 P.2d 1028, 1036 
(Utah 1985). The parties to the Release delivered $225,000 to 
Freier in exchange for Freierrs promise to release them from 
further liability. Davis gave nothing. Davis promised 
nothing. Davis bargained for nothing. Freier promised Davis 
nothing. In fact, Freier expressly reserved his right to 
continue pursuing his claim against Davis. 
Davis claims that Freier is disingenuous in this 
argument. The disingenuous argument is Davis's argument that 
he, a stranger to the Release, paying no consideration, is 
somehow pulled under the umbrella of the Release just because 
someone, not Davis, paid consideration for it. If that were 
true, a plaintiff could never settle with and release one of 
multiple tortfeasors and continue to pursue nonsettling 
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tortfeasors. Every nonsettling tortfeasor would claim a right 
to be released for the consideration paid by the settling 
tortfeasors• 
POINT HID 
(REPLYING TO RESPONDENT'S POINT HID) 
THE LANGUAGE OF THE RELEASE ALLOWS 
FREIER'S CLAIM AGAINST DAVIS 
Davis argues that a contract is construed against the 
drafter and then states that this Release was drafted by 
Freier. There is no evidence of that; no citation to the 
record; no testimony. It's also not true. 
The intent of the parties can be drawn from the 
language of the document and circumstances surrounding the 
transaction. Ron Case Roofing & Asphalt v. Blomquist, 773 P.2d 
1382 (Utah 1989). The Release language, and the express 
reservation of rights against Davis, were sufficient evidence 
of the parties' intent to defeat Davis's Motion for Summary 
Judgment. Davis is wrong to state that no evidence of. intent 
was offered in response to the summary judgment motion. 
Generally, the document itself is the best evidence, as it is 
here, of the parties' intent. 
Finally, Davis claims that there is no language in 
the Release to show an intent to cut off the released 
defendants' liability under respondent superior. The second 
paragraph of the Release releases the defendants paying 
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consideration and "their agents, servants, employees. . . . " 
The language of the Release reserving claims against 
Davis "except as he may be an employee of Border, Kanarra, 
Manza. • ." can easily be interpreted to mean that the 
defendants paying consideration, not Davis, are released from 
any liability for a judgment against Davis based on respondent 
superior. In fact, that is a more reasonable and consistent 
interpretation under the circumstances of the Release and the 
reservation of rights. As previously discussed, Davis's 
interpretation renders the reservation meaningless. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the above argument and authorities, the 
plaintiffs request that the judgment of the trial court be 
reversed and that the plaintiffs be allowed to pursue their 
negligence claim against Davis as a matter of law, or that the 
case be remanded to the trial court to determine the issues of 
fact regarding Jeremy Freier's and James Davis's employment 
status and the intent of the parties to the Release. 
DATED this 2 3 day of July, 1990. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
By: A.u 4 (IJ 
GLEN A. COOK 
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ADDENDUM 
Appellant is aware of the Addendum requirement. There 
is no addendum to Appellant's Reply Brief. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Point I assumes that Davis and Freier are co-
employees under the Act. Freier can pursue this negligence 
claim against Davis under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-57 ("Section 
57"). Section 57 is an exception to the exclusive remedy of 
Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-60. Section 57 allows an injured worker 
to pursue negligence claims against an employer and/or co-
employee
 r if the employer does not provide workers' compensation 
benefits to the injured worker. That is the case here. The 
exception of Section 57 applies to negligence claims against the 
employer and any negligent co-employee of the injured worker. 
POINT II 
Jeremy Freier was not an employee of Schrenk, Kanarra 
and/or Manza under the Act. At the least, questions of fact 
exist regarding Freier's employment status. Summary judgment 
against Freier on the employment issue was improper. Davis has 
the burden of proving that Freier is an employee because Davis 
is seeking the protection of the exclusive remedy provision of 
the Act. Davis has not carried that burden. 
Deposition testimony raises questions of fact about 
whether Freier was an employee as defined in Utah Code Ann. §35-
1-43 ("Section 43"); whether Schrenk was an employer under Utah 
Code Ann. § 35-1-42(3)(a)(ii); and the extent of control, if any, 
exercised by Schrenk over Freier, 
POINT IIA 
Questions of fact exist as to whether Schrenk is an 
employer under Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-42(3)(a)(ii) and is, 
therefore, an employer under the Act. This issue is also 
addressed in Point II. 
POINT IIB 
The relationship between Freier and Schrenk satisfies 
the casual employment standard of Utah Code Ann. § 35-1-
43(1)(b). Freier is not, therefore, an employee under the Act. 
Deposition testimony establishes that Freier did not work on a 
regular basis, that Freier was not paid any wage for work done, 
that the work was at irregular intervals and for a temporary 
purpose, and that there were no foreman or supervisors.over the 
workers. Whether employment is casual is a question of fact. 
Summary judgment was improper. 
POINT IIIA 
Freier may pursue his negligence claim against Davis 
whether or not Davis was Schrenk's employee. Davis's liability 
is based on his conduct, not his employment status with Schrenk. 
If Davis had a duty to supervise Justin Anderson, regardless of 
Davis's employment status, he may be liable if he breached that 
duty* Davis's claim that Davis can only owe a duty to Freier if 
Davis and Freier are co-employees is false. If the facts show a 
duty on Davis's part to supervise Anderson, it doesn't matter 
whether Davis and Freier are co-employees. That duty would 
extend to all third parties. 
POINT IIIB 
Davis is not a third party beneficiary of the Release. 
The rights of third party beneficiaries are determined by the 
intent of the parties to the contract. That intent must be 
clear. The parties to the Release had no intent to benefit 
Davis. In fact, the only specific reference to Davis in the 
Release is where Freier reserves his right to pursue this claim. 
That reservation is directly contrary to any intent to benefit 
Davis. 
POINT IIIC 
Davis paid no consideration for the Release and cannot 
enforce it. Freier acknowledges that the parties released under 
the Release paid consideration. Davis didn't. Consideration is 
an act or a promise bargained for and given in exchange for a 
promise. Davis gave nothing for the Release. Davis promised 
nothing and bargained for nothing. Davis cannot pull himself 
under the umbrella of the Release simply because someone else 
paid consideration for the Release. 
POINT HID 
The language of the Release allows Freier's claim 
against Davis. The language of the Release and the circum-
stances surrounding the Release establish the intent to reserve 
Freier's liability claims against Davis. The Release language 
reserving claims against Davis "except as he may be an employee 
of Border, Kanarra, Manza. . . ."is consistently and reasonably 
interpreted to release the parties who paid consideration from 
vicarious liability. Davis's interpretation of the reservation 
language renders the reservation meaningless. 
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